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INTRODUCTION
[1]
Technologies like digital audio, the Internet, and broadband
communications spur economic growth and foster new patterns of
commerce and social interaction. But they also spawn disruptive
innovations that force established industries to forge novel responses or
risk falling by the wayside.1 The horse-and-buggy industry,2 vaudeville,3

*
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an engineering-management consultancy since 1981, and has written and spoken
extensively about new media for over two decades. He holds degrees in Math, Physics,
and Computer Science, is a May, 2010 J.D. candidate at Albany Law School, and works
as a Law Clerk at the Albany, NY intellectual property firm Heslin, Rothenberg, Farley,
and Mesiti. The contents of this article do not reflect the opinions or policies of PC
Magazine, Albany Law School, or HRFM. The author would like to dedicate this work
to Albany Law School's Robert Emery and Daniel Moriarty, in appreciation for their
unrelenting encouragement and criticism, and to the late Professor Jeffrey Armstrong, a
good friend and the first person to fully grasp the premise of this article after a single
reading.

1

See generally infra Parts II−III (describing how technological innovation can give rise
to economic upheavals).

2

See Thomas A. Kinney, From Shop to Factory in the Industrial Heartland: The
Industrialization of Horse-Drawn Vehicle Manufacture in the City of Cleveland (Sept.
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and video-rental stores4 are but a few examples of thriving markets that
found themselves on the scrap heap of obsolescence because they failed to
react quickly to the devastating effects of new technology.5
[2]
Industries faced with such challenges often look to the law for
help, as do new-technology upstarts that feel bullied by their entrenched
competition.6 But legislatures and the courts have rarely done more than
delay the inevitable.7 One reason has been the all-too-common failure of

28, 1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Case Western Reserve University), available
at http://ech.case.edu/ech-cgi/article.pl?id=WACI (describing how none of Cleveland’s
“enormous wagon and carriage factories” survived the introduction of the automobile).
3

See, e.g., West Virginia State University Capitol Center, Welcome to Capitol Center:
History, http://capcenter.wvstateu.edu/history.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2009) (“With the
advent of ‘talkies’ in the late ’20s, . . . live stage shows were suddenly things of the
past.”).

4

See, e.g., Posting of Matt Buchanan to Gizmodo, http://gizmodo.com/ (Nov. 2, 2007,
01:15 EST) (noting that Blockbuster is the only video-store chain to remain profitable
and that its only hope of survival is to “[m]ov[e] into new distribution channels,” and that
“things are looking grim for the corner rental store”).

5

All three industries were displaced with startling speed by new markets created by the
automobile, the motion picture soundtrack, and Internet movie distribution. See supra
notes 2−4 and accompanying text.

6

See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 417 (1984)
(providing an example of unsuccessful petitioning of the Supreme Court to outlaw home
video-recording); Deep v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., Inc., 540 U.S. 1107, 1107
(2004); see also Declan McCullagh, High Court Turns Deaf Ear to Aimster, CNET
NEWS, Jan. 13, 2004, http://www.news.com/2100-1028-5139938.html (discussing the
Supreme Court’s refusal in Deep v. RIAA to hear Aimster’s argument that the online file
sharing service had legitimate non-infringing uses).
7

Regardless of how the cases listed supra at note 6 were decided, none were able to halt
the disruptive effect of new technology. Sony could not stop the inexorable growth of
home video-recording and none of the recording industry’s many legal victories could
save it from decimation by online file sharing. See generally JAMES LARDNER, FAST
FORWARD: HOLLYWOOD, THE JAPANESE, AND THE ONSLAUGHT OF THE VCR (1st ed.
1987) (describing the content industry’s efforts to suppress personal video-recording
technologies); AERNOUT SCHMIDT, WILFRED DOLFSMA & WIM KEUVELAAR, FIGHTING
THE WAR ON FILE SHARING 85−86, 90 (2007) (noting that the record industry’s successful
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conventional legal analysis to address the irreconcilable differences
between warring factions’ basic assumptions, beliefs, and norms of
behavior.8 This article argues that such disparities are functionally similar
to the “cognitive dissonances” that behavioral and social psychologists
observe in conflicted individuals9 and synthesizes a dissonance-based
analytical model suited to such controversies.10 It concludes that
lawmakers and courts seeking to remedy the social ills caused by
technological disruption should consider classical dissonance-reduction
strategies used successfully in the social sciences.11
[3]
This article assembles this thesis in three steps. It first synthesizes
Thomas Kuhn’s observations about paradigm shifts12 with modern
economic and business management theories to create a general model of
the large-scale social and economic disruption that accompanies
technological innovation.13 Next, it draws upon principles of behavioral
and social psychology to find parallels between internal conflicts (or
“cognitive dissonances”) experienced by individuals and those that arise
within communities on either side of a paradigm shift.14 Finally, it asserts
that lawmakers, regulators, and the courts must consider the effect of such

effort to shut down the centralized Napster network merely encouraged file sharing
entrepreneurs to develop more resilient decentralized topologies such as Gnutella).
8

See infra Part VII.A.

9

See generally LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (Stanford
University Press 1957) (deriving the basic precepts of cognitive dissonance theory).

10

See infra Parts V−VI.

11

See infra Part VII.B.

12

See infra note 18.

13

See infra Part II.

14

See infra Parts III−V.
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dissonances when devising legal remedies to controversies created by
disruptive innovation.15
[4]
Part II of this article lays the groundwork for this argument by
introducing the concept of shared paradigms and describing how a
technology-driven shift to a new paradigm advances scientific and social
progress even as it devastates established markets. Part III calls upon
evolutionary economic theory to describe the Darwinian process that links
these shifts to disruptive technological innovation. Part IV surveys
cognitive dissonance theory, which psychologists have traditionally used
to predict and explain the ways individuals respond to conflicts among
their personal beliefs, assumptions, and behavioral norms. Part V ties
everything together into a unified theory of paradigmatic dissonance that
extends cognitive dissonance doctrine to the thorny controversies that
arise when disruptive technology spawns a community whose members
share an unprecedented paradigm or business model. Part VI integrates
this model into modern jurisprudential thought, specifically linking the
precepts of behavioral psychology to the neoclassical principles framing
the Law and Economics movement. Part VII applies paradigmatic
dissonance to our legal system, comparing it to conventional Rationalist
approaches and using it to suggest more effective ways to analyze and
remedy disputes rooted in disruptive technological innovation.
I. SETTING THE STAGE
[5]
Markets come and markets go; history is littered with the cadavers
of once-healthy industries that failed to react quickly enough to new
technology.16 Consider, for example, the way that markets rose and fell as
waves of innovation drove consumers from live burlesque to radio, to free
over-the-air television, and then to various flavors of subscription TV.
Repeatedly, industries and the cultures they feed have been unseated by
newer technologies that better met the needs of consumers. The survivors

15

See infra Part VII.

16

See, e.g., supra notes 2−5 and accompanying text.

4

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XVI, Issue 1

are those nimble enough to devise business models that successfully
exploit new technologies.17
[6]
Despite the painful ramifications for established industries, this
quasi-evolutionary process of stability, disruption, adaptation, and renewal
ultimately is beneficial to society.18 Technology that fosters more
efficient and flexible ways of working, playing, communicating, or
transacting business serves the public good and is essential for survival in
a global economy.19 Like a fire that clears deadwood, periodic exfoliation
is an efficient way to revitalize stagnating markets.20

17

Consider the motion picture industry, which has survived for nearly a century by
maintaining the flexibility to extract revenue from potentially disruptive technologies
ranging from sound recording to broadcast television, the VCR, cable TV, and the
Internet. See generally A CONCISE HANDBOOK OF MOVIE INDUSTRY ECONOMICS
(Charles C. Moul ed., 2005); THE AMERICAN MOVIE INDUSTRY: THE BUSINESS OF
MOTION PICTURES (Gorham Kindem ed., 1982).
18

See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 66, 97−98 (2d ed.
1970); JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 83−84
(Harper & Row 1976) (1942); Aron S. Spencer & Bruce A. Kirchhoff, Schumpeter and
New Technology Based Firms: Towards a Framework for How NTBFs Cause Creative
Destruction, 2 INT’L ENTREPRENEURSHIP & MGMT. J. 145, 146 (2006).

19

See Spencer & Kirchhoff, supra note 18, at 146.

20

Contrast this to the case where industries have survived by anticipating and riding each
new wave of innovation as it breaks. In such cases, businesses are able to prevent
paradigm shifts by incorporating non-disruptive sustaining technologies into their
business models. See CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN
NEW TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL xviii−xix (HarperBusiness 2000)
(1997) (describing the differences between disruptive and sustaining technologies). In
the rewritable-DVD industry, tier one manufacturers survived for years by exploiting
every technological advance in the medium with a new product line. Each generation
commanded higher margins long enough to subsidize R&D costs, and by the time
offshore vendors could drive down prices with reverse-engineered knockoffs, the next
launch was ready to go. This cyclical model kept the industry healthy until it finally hit
the physical limits of the medium. Similar business models are common in the computer
and consumer electronics industries. See, e.g., Don Labriola, Discs After DVD: BlueLight Specials, PC MAGAZINE, May 18, 2005, http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,
2704,1820927,00.asp.
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[7]
The situation is less clear-cut when a business is inundated by a
technological tsunami that it fails to predict. Laws that do no more than
prop up inundated businesses paddle against an inexorable current.21
There were certainly good reasons, for example, to give the record
industry legal tools to defend itself against the unauthorized online
distribution of its assets.22 But lawmakers and the courts might have
better served the major labels by considering the bigger picture.23 As
important as it is to protect intellectual property rights, statutes enacted or
applied in response to technological disruption must consider the
overarching natural selection process that ensures our economy’s
continued vitality.24 The laws of the wild are harsh, but established
industries sometimes benefit when forced to fend for themselves against
new business models.25 The challenge for lawmakers and adjudicators is
to balance the legal rights of traditional businesses against the survival of

21

The theorists discussed in Parts II−IV are unanimous in their contention that these
types of technology-driven mass migrations, once begun, cannot be stopped for long.
See, e.g., infra notes 45, 60.
22

See, e.g., Brief of Ass’n for Independent Music as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Appellees at 3−7, A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2000)
(No. 00-16401), 2000 WL 33979744.
23

See, e.g., Brian Hiatt & Evan Serpick, The Record Industry’s Decline: Record Sales
Are Tanking, and There’s No Hope in Sight: How It All Went Wrong, ROLLING STONE,
June
28,
2007,
http://www.rollingstone.com/news/story/15137581/the_record_industrys_decline/
(stating that, like many industry insiders, talent management company CEO Jeff
Kwatinetz now believes that suing Napster “was the moment that the labels killed
themselves”).
24

This process will be described from several perspectives infra in Parts II−V, and its
application to legal controversies discussed infra in Parts VI.A and VII.B.

25

See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 446 (1984),
where the Supreme Court’s refusal to outlaw videocassette recorders forced the movie
industry to figure out how to instead use the technology to create a profitable aftermarket;
see also LARDNER, supra note 7.
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pioneers who leverage new technology into more efficient (and often
unforeseeable) markets—a task akin to playing chess blindfolded.26
II. SHIFTING PARADIGMS
A. THE ELUSIVE PARADIGM
[8]
Hand-waving marketeers and pop-culture theorists have long used
the word “paradigm” as a linguistic spittoon, plugging it with any meaning
that happened to need a receptacle at the moment.27 If defined with
precision, however, the concept of shared paradigms can be an effective
way to characterize and understand cultural and economic transitions.
[9]
The current meaning of the word “paradigm” emerged in the
natural sciences with the publication of epistemologist28 and science
historian Thomas Kuhn’s influential 1962 essay “The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions.”29 Kuhn described a prototypical shared paradigm
that he conceptualized as a “disciplinary matrix” of beliefs and practices
that define a scientific discipline.30 Kuhn’s “disciplinary matrix” concept

26

See infra Part VII.B.2.f (describing how new business models are intrinsically
unpredictable).

27

See ROBERT LAWRENCE TRASK, MIND THE GAFFE! A TROUBLESHOOTER’S GUIDE TO
ENGLISH STYLE AND USAGE 200 (2006) (“[P]aradigm has become a vogue word, and
today it is used far too freely, and often pretentiously, when a simpler word would be
preferable. . . . Moreover, be very wary of the expression paradigm shift. This term . . .
has been . . . applied with wearisome frequency to almost any change in policy or
fashion.”).
28

Epistemology is a branch of philosophy that studies the nature of knowledge, its means
of production, and the way that it relates to concepts like truth, belief, and skepticism.
See
Britannica
Online
Encyclopedia,
Epistemology
(Philosophy),
http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9106052/epistemology (last visited Oct. 12, 2009).
29

See KUHN, supra note 18.

30

Id. at 182. Kuhn initially defined the term as “the entire constellation of beliefs,
values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community.” Id. at 175.
But he later described a narrower type of “paradigm” that was a subset of the disciplinary
matrix: “the concrete puzzle-solutions which, employed as models or examples, can

7

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XVI, Issue 1

remains useful today in the natural sciences and does not differ
fundamentally from the modern understanding of a scientific “paradigm”
as a “set of assumptions, models[,] and methods that serves as common,
almost canonic knowledge in a discipline.”31
[10] Kuhn confined his work to scientific communities, but he was
quick to note that it could legitimately be extended to other fields,32 a
prediction long since fulfilled in disciplines ranging from sociology33 to
management science34 and information technology.35 The concept,
however, has not always survived translation, often suffering arbitrary

replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal
science.” Id. This article will use only the original “disciplinary matrix” definition when
referring to Kuhnian paradigms.
31

SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 7, at 147 n.33.

32

KUHN, supra note 18, at 208−09 (explicitly calling for “comparative study of the
corresponding communities in other fields” and observing that his “theses are
undoubtedly of wide applicability” because Kuhn himself had borrowed many
assumptions from the social sciences, literature, music, the arts, politics, and other
disciplines).
33

See, e.g., Leonard B. Bliss, J.C. Greene’s Methods in Social Inquiry, 2 J. MIXED
METHODS RESEARCH 190, 191 (2008) (book review) (crediting the late University of
Toronto Sociology Professor Madan Handa as having introduced the notion of social
paradigm in the context of social sciences in his unpublished paper, Peace Paradigm:
Transcending Liberal and Marxian Paradigms, presented at International Symposium on
Science, Technology and Development (Mar. 20−25, 1987) (mimeographed transcript
available in the O.I.S.E. Library, Univ. of Toronto)).
34

See, e.g., Jason Withrow & Mark Geljon, Paradigm Dissonance: A Significant Factor
in Design and Business Problems, BOXES AND ARROWS, Dec. 11, 2003, http://www.
boxesandarrows.com/view/paradigm_dissonance_a_significant_factor_in_design_and_bu
siness_problems.
35

See,
e.g.,
PCMag.com
Encyclopedia,
Paradigm
Shift
Definition,
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0,,t=paradigm+shift&i=57310,00.asp
(last
visited Oct. 14, 2009) (claiming that one example of a “paradigm shift” is “accessing
applications and data from the Web instead of from local servers”).

8
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redefinition.36 This article will use the term “paradigm” conservatively to
describe a collection of assumptions, beliefs, and norms of behavior that
(i) are specific to an industry, customer base, or other clearly demarcated
community and (ii) shape the way that such a community conducts itself
and perceives the world. This approach is faithful both to Kuhn’s original
concept and to current usage,37 yet broad enough to be applied with
precision to non-scientific communities and markets associated with
specific technologies.38
B. PARADIGM SHIFTS
[11] Kuhn likened a paradigm to a scientific community’s blueprint for
solving problems, calling experimental work done within an established
paradigm “normal science.”39 Unlike traditional notions of scientific
progress as a linear, incremental process that occurs within a static
universe, Kuhn observed that the most important leaps take place when
normalcy is interrupted by anomalies40 that cannot be accommodated by
36

The computer industry, for example, defines “paradigm” broadly as any “model,
example
or
pattern,”
PCMag.com
Encyclopedia,
Paradigm
Definition,
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0,2542,t=paradigm&i=48811,00.asp
(last
visited Oct. 14, 2009), a characterization that has encouraged pundits to apply it to
everything from user-interface styles, Jan Ozer, Pinnacle Edition DV, PC MAGAZINE,
Sep. 17, 2002, http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,480618,00.asp, to the way that
Microsoft Word structures documents, Edward Mendelson, The Best Office Alternatives,
PC
MAGAZINE,
Nov.
26,
2007,
available
at
http://www.pcmag.
com/print_article2/0,1217,a=220175,00.asp.
37

The American Heritage Dictionary defines “paradigm” as “[a] set of assumptions,
concepts, values, and practices that constitutes a way of viewing reality for the
community that shares them, especially in an intellectual discipline.” Dictionary.com,
Paradigm Definition, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/paradigm (last visited Oct.
14, 2009).

38

See, e.g., infra Part VII.C.

39

KUHN, supra note 14, at 10, 24.

40

An anomaly in this context is a discovery with implications that contradict the
assumptions and beliefs of the current paradigm, or that render that paradigm’s norms of
behavior ineffective or inadequate. Id. at 52−53.
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the prevailing paradigm.41 He dubbed such an event a “crisis.”42 In
extreme cases, which he later called “paradigm shifts,”43 a community in
crisis undergoes a scientific revolution that compels it to adopt an entirely
new paradigm that better fits the troublesome data.44 When this occurs, it
is impossible for the old and new paradigms to coexist.45 Kuhn called this
characteristic “incommensurability,” stating that profound differences in
the ways that such overlapping worldviews interpret basic definitions and
standards make it impossible even to compare, much less to reconcile
them.46

41

Kuhn gave an example of such a crisis in nineteenth century optical physics, when
mounting evidence that a beam of light could act like a stream of particles could not be
explained by assumptions intrinsic to the prevailing paradigm of the wave theory of light.
This crisis was resolved only when the scientific community shifted over the next halfcentury to a relativistic paradigm that could account for this evidence. Id. at 11−13,
107−08. This example also illustrates Kuhn’s observation that paradigm shifts can take
decades to complete and often require the death or retirement of most of the community
members who had vested emotionally in the earlier paradigm. Id. at 150−52.
42

Id. at 66−73 (repeatedly referring to several such incidents as “crises”).

43

Id. at 103−06 (first using the term “paradigm shift” several times in the Postscript to
the Enlarged Second Edition).

44

Id. at 84−85.

45

Id. at 98 (declaring it an “historical implausibility” that a new scientific theory or
paradigm could arise without discrediting and displacing its predecessor).

46

See id. at 149 (observing that a new paradigm, although likely to borrow vocabulary,
concepts, and procedures from the traditional worldview it replaces, “seldom employ[s
them in] the traditional way”); see also id. at 150 (stating that “the proponents of the
competing paradigms practice their trades in different worlds,” meaning that differences
in basic assumptions change the way that old- and new-paradigm communities perceive
common aspects of reality); cf. id. at 101−02 (citing as an example the
incommensurability of Newtonian and Einsteinian mechanics, where even seemingly
equivalent terms like “mass” have fundamentally different meanings).
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Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XVI, Issue 1

[12] Nonetheless, Kuhn considered paradigm shifts to be an essential
catalyst of scientific progress47 that “invariably” result in the advancement
of science.48 He described them as part of an evolutionary process that
naturally selects the worldview that best explains both anomalous
observations and the greatest number of phenomena that fall within the
traditional model.49 Such a mechanism, he argued, may not foster a model
that is objectively “closer to the truth,”50 but it cannot possibly result in
anything other than progress.51
[13] Kuhn also observed that the mere discovery of an anomaly does
not always trigger a paradigm shift.52 If a troubling observation does not
essentially conflict with a fundamental component of a traditional
paradigm, a community may find some way to accommodate the anomaly
by applying traditional paradigms in new ways or by redefining the
troublesome observation to fall within some other discipline.53 The
47

Id. at 77 (summarizing the prior chapter with the assumption that scientific “crises are a
necessary precondition for the emergence of novel theories”).
48

Id. at 173 (“[P]aradigm change invariably produce[s] an instrument more perfect . . .
than those known before[.]”).

49

Id. at 109−10 (presenting paradigm shifts as a natural selection process that fosters
competition among worldviews to best explain anomalies that thwarted the old
paradigm); id. at 172 (drawing explicit parallels between scientific progress and Darwin’s
theory of biological “evolution”). Kuhn also noted that, at least in the field of
mathematics, new paradigms often represent a step forward because they are likely to
provide “neater” or “simpler” solutions than the paradigms they replace. Id. at 155−56.
50

Id. at 148−51 (arguing that the principle of incommensurability made such a claim
impossible to measure).
51

Id. at 172−73.

52

Id. at 84 (explaining that a paradigm shift becomes inevitable only when a traditional
paradigm is totally unable to explain a fundamentally troubling anomaly and asserting
that a scientific community may approach the problem by i) devising creative ways to
explain the anomaly within the current paradigm, ii) declaring the anomaly inexplicable
at the current state-of-the-art and reserving it for analysis by future generations, or iii)
migrating to a new paradigm that can explain the anomaly).
53

Id.
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community may even completely sidestep the problem by declaring it
beyond the current state-of-the-art and setting it aside for consideration by
future researchers armed with next-generation clinical tools.54
III. CREATIVE DESTRUCTION AND DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION
[14] Despite their disparate vantage points, Kuhn’s analysis of
paradigm dynamics has much in common with the evolutionary school of
economics. Both view technological innovation and its effects as an
inevitable, adaptive, even quasi-organic, process akin to natural
selection.55 And like Kuhn, evolutionary economists believe that, despite
the havoc that a paradigm shift wreaks upon a traditional community, such
transitions are a prerequisite for progress.56 This school has become an
integral part of modern macroeconomic theory.57

54

Id.

55

Economist.com, Economics A−Z http://www.economist.com/research/Economics/
alphabetic.cfm?letter=E#evolutionaryeconomics (last visited Oct. 14, 2009).
“Evolutionary economics” is defined as “[a] Darwinian approach to [economics] . . . .
Following the tradition of S[chumpeter], it views the economy as an evolving system and
places a strong emphasis on dynamics, changing structures (including technologies,
institutions, beliefs and behaviour) and [disequilibrium] processes (such as [innovation],
selection and imitation).” Id.; see also Richard R. Nelson, Recent Evolutionary
Theorizing About Economic Change, 33 J. ECON. LITERATURE 48, 49 (1995) (noting that
Darwinian analogies come naturally to economists, who often “make use of ‘biological
conceptions’ or metaphors” when speaking colloquially about their work).
56

See SCHUMPETER, supra note 18; ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THE SOCIAL SCIENCE VIEW 14
(Richard Swedberg ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2000).
57

The pioneering work of the evolutionary economists discussed here has been
acknowledged by numerous authorities and has earned them several Nobel Prizes. See,
e.g., The Bernard Schwartz Center for Economic Policy Analysis, http://homepage.
newschool.edu/het//profiles/solow.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2009) (“Robert Solow is one
of the major figures of the Neo-Keynesian Synthesis macroeconomics.”); All Laureates
in Economics, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/ economics/laureates (last visited Oct.
14, 2009) (listing evolutionary economist Paul Samuelson’s 1970 Nobel Prize “for the
scientific work through which he has developed static and dynamic economic theory and
actively contributed to raising the level of analysis in economic science” and Solow’s
1987 Nobel Prize “for his contributions to the theory of economic growth”).
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A. SCHUMPETER AND SELF-DESTRUCTING CAPITALISM
[15] Joseph Schumpeter’s analysis of the role of entrepreneurship
profoundly influenced twentieth-century economic thought.58 In his
posthumous 1954 book The History of Economic Analysis, he described a
cyclical model of “creative destruction” that ties closed-universe economic
development to endlessly recurring sequences of equilibrium, disruption,
transition/adaptation, and renewed stability.59 He portrayed capitalism as
a self-devouring process of monopoly and breakup, where technologydriven entrepreneurship continually and inexorably interrupts the “steadystate” economic equilibrium that normally exists in the absence of
entrepreneurial perturbation.60
[16] In Schumpeter’s view, this “creative destruction” was an essential
component of capitalism that was responsible for economic growth.61
Like Kuhn, his observations lead to the conclusion that governments
should avoid unduly hampering technological progress by seeking too
zealously to shield traditional industries from its disruptive effects.62
B. TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND THE
SOLOW-SWAN NEOCLASSICAL MODEL

58

For a compelling biography of Schumpeter, who is often named one of the founding
fathers of evolutionary economic theory, see THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHET OF
INNOVATION: JOSEPH SCHUMPETER AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION (2007).
59

See SCHUMPETER, supra note 18, at 83.

60

Id.; see also JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: AN
INQUIRY INTO PROFITS, CAPITAL, CREDIT, INTEREST, AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE 66−67
(Oxford Univ. Press 1978) (1934) (describing capitalism’s “competitive destruction of
the old” and enumerating the five classes of disruptive innovations that entrepreneurs
introduce into steady-state systems).
61

SCHUMPETER, supra note 18, at 84.

62

The assertions that paradigm shifts are a vital component of scientific or economic
progress and that blindly interfering with them can lead to unintended consequences are
common threads that span the breadth of this article. See generally Parts II−VI.
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[17] Robert Solow and Trevor Swan refined and quantified
Schumpeter’s work and developed the Solow-Swan Neoclassical model of
economic growth.63 This theory states that overall economic progress
within a Schumpeterian closed system is driven solely by (i) increases in
“inputs” (primarily labor and capital) and (ii) exogenous technical
progress.64 It concludes that economies naturally converge toward a
steady-state growth rate that depends upon the pace of technological
progress and changes in the size of the labor force.65 If the workforce
increases at a steady, predictable rate, then overall economic growth
(adjusting for factors like depreciation and inflation) becomes a function
of the pace of technological innovation.66 This model has since been
applied to determine that eighty percent of post-World War II growth in
domestic productivity was due primarily to global research and
development.67

63

See WARREN J. SAMUELS ET AL., A COMPANION TO THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC
THOUGHT 413−14 (2003). See generally Robert Solow, A Contribution to the Theory of
Economic Growth, 70 Q.J. ECON. 65 (1956) (introducing the author’s theory in full
quantification); Trevor W. Swan, Economic Growth and Capital Accumulation, 32 ECON.
REC. 334 (1956) (presenting an elaboration of Swan’s initial presentation of what would
become his neoclassical growth theory).
64

See SAMUELS ET AL., supra note 63, at 413−14 (citing the Neoclassical Model’s
“golden rule” for economic growth, which holds that rate of return on capital investments
depends solely on “the rate of growth of the labor force, the rate of technical progress,
and the rate of depreciation”).
65

See id.

66

See id.

67

Charles I. Jones, Sources of U.S. Economic Growth in a World of Ideas, 92 AM. ECON.
REV. 220, 234-35 (2002) (using the Solow model to determine that eighty percent of
domestic economic growth from 1950 to 1993 was due to increases in educational
attainment and world R&D levels).
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C. CHRISTENSEN AND DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION
[18] These theories burst into mainstream consciousness when Harvard
Business School professor Clayton Christensen’s best-selling 1997 book,
The Innovator’s Dilemma, introduced a theory of business management
that addressed the destabilizing market effects of “disruptive
technologies.”68 Unlike “sustaining technologies,” which generally are
incorporated into existing business models, Christensen’s disruptive
technologies spawn new markets that small, innovative companies can
hijack from under the noses of established businesses.69 He stated that
such technologies, so long as they are sufficiently different from
traditional models, would displace even clearly superior alternatives if
they better fit the needs of an emerging (and overlooked) user
community.70 The new markets are often too small to attract the attention
of established interests initially, but they can grow rapidly enough to
displace entire industries71 through a natural selection process much like a
Kuhnian paradigm shift or Schumpeter’s creative destruction.
[19] Christensen ultimately revised his theory to identify “disruptive
innovation” as the true catalyst, arguing that the novel application of
technology within a new business model, rather than the technology itself,
is the cause of market disruption.72

68

See CHRISTENSEN, supra note 20, at xxii−xxviii (describing the general principles and
characteristics of disruptive innovations); id. at 111−14 (summarizing the author’s
suggestions for managing disruptive change).
69

Id. at xviii−xx.

70

Id. at 219−21.

71

Id. at 265−66.

72

Christensen’s The Innovator’s Solution (the sequel to The Innovator’s Dilemma)
generally substitutes the phrase “disruptive innovation” for “disruptive technology.”
CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S SOLUTION (2003); see also The
Opportunity and Threat of Disruptive Technologies (CD-ROM, Harvard Bus. Sch. Publ’g
2003) (presenting a 62-minute video lecture during which Christensen tells how Intel
CEO Andy Grove suggested the terminology change just as The Innovator’s Solution was
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IV. DISSONANCE AND COGNITION
A. FESTINGER AND COGNITIVE DISSONANCE
[20] Business and economic theories that describe the mechanics and
implications of paradigm shifts do not explain why the appearance of even
a single anomaly would drive a community to desert long-held beliefs and
norms. Is there some fundamental aspect of human nature that compels
groups to abandon a worldview en masse whenever an ostensibly fitter
one comes along? Are lawmakers’ efforts to shield traditional business
models from new technology invariably doomed to failure? More to the
point, given the historical consensus that paradigm shifts are an essential
and indispensible condition of economic progress, is such a goal even
desirable?
[21] One set of answers can be found in cognitive dissonance theory, a
branch of social psychology that describes the ways that conflicted
individuals respond to internal contradictions.73
[22] Dissonance theory may be virgin territory to the legal profession,
but it is well-tread ground in the social sciences. Current thinking dates
back to psychologist Leon Festinger’s seminal 1957 text, A Theory of
Cognitive Dissonance, which revealed the surprising findings of his
clinical research into the motivations of behavior.74
[23] Festinger defined “cognitions” as “any type of human knowledge,
opinion, or belief about the environment, about oneself, or about one’s

going to press), available at http://www.viddler.com/explore/sleibson/videos/3/# (17minute excerpt).
73

The Encyclopedia Britannica states that “cognitive dissonance” explains why people
seek to preserve their current understanding of the world by “reject[ing], explain[ing]
away, or avoid[ing] the [challenging] information” or by convincing themselves that no
conflict really exists.
Britannica Online Encyclopedia, Cognitive Dissonance
(Psychology, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/124498/cognitive-dissonance
(last visited Oct. 14, 2009).
74

FESTINGER, supra note 9.
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behavior”75—a kitchen-sink classification that accommodates everything
from religious and political ideologies to Internet file-sharers’ beliefs
about the morality of their downloading practices. Within this model, a
shared paradigm (that is, is a collective set of assumptions, beliefs, and
behavioral norms) is merely a set of cognitions held by all members of a
community.76
[24] Festinger found “cognitive dissonance” when an individual is
faced with two cognitions that lead to obverse results.77 A record buyer,
for example, might believe that shoplifting a CD would be an act of
theft—a cognition that leads to the conclusion that acquiring a commercial
recording without payment is immoral. But if that same person falls into
the habit of downloading copyrighted music from unauthorized Internet
services, that behavior leads to a second cognition that spawns the obverse
conclusion that he is allowed to take commercially produced music for
free. The tension between those two conclusions is a classic example of
cognitive dissonance between a belief and a norm of behavior.78
[25] Festinger frequently saw his subjects struggling to avoid the
obverse implications of their dissonant cognitions, an observation that led
him to conclude that dissonance is profoundly aversive.79 He also

75

Id. at 3.

76

See supra notes 37−38 and accompanying text.

77

JOEL COOPER, COGNITIVE DISSONANCE: FIFTY YEARS OF A CLASSIC THEORY 6 (2007)
(“The state of cognitive dissonance occurs when people believe that two of their
psychological representations are inconsistent with each other. More formally, a pair of
cognitions is inconsistent if one cognition follows from the obverse (opposite) of the
other.”).

78

See FESTINGER, supra note 9, at 5.

79

See COOPER, supra note 77, at 2−3 (“Festinger . . . made a very basic observation about
. . . human beings: we do not like inconsistency. It upsets us and drives us to action to
reduce our inconsistency. . . . People do not just prefer consistency over inconsistency. . .
. [They] are driven to resolve that inconsistency. How we go about dealing with our
inconsistency can be rather ingenious. But, in Festinger’s view, there is little question
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discovered that cognitive dissonances could be assigned magnitudes and
that a dissonance’s aversive effect increases monotonically with its
magnitude80—a key finding that has helped psychologists predict
responses to dissonance-altering stimuli.81
[26] Festinger’s basic premises remain valid today, but fifty years of
analysis and observation have produced refinements.82 Joel Cooper’s
“New Look” model83 asserts that dissonance produces aversion only when
a subject deliberately takes steps to produce obverse conclusions and is
fully aware of the consequences of that decision. Furthermore, the extent
of this volition and commitment is now considered a key factor in
determining the magnitude of a dissonance and its resulting aversive
effect.84

that it will be done.”). In layman’s terms, this aversion is most often described as a
nagging “discomfort” with the conflict that creates the dissonance. Id. at 57.
80

Id. at 7 (noting that one distinguishing characteristic of Festinger’s theory was that it
assigned magnitude to cognitive dissonance that was proportional to, among other things,
the severity of contradiction between the conclusions that arise from the cognitive pair).

81

See JACK W. BREHM & ARTHUR R. COHEN, EXPLORATIONS IN COGNITIVE DISSONANCE
302−06 (1962) (summarizing factors that contributed to clinically observed dissonance
magnitudes and that indirectly determined how subjects responded to stimuli).
82

See COOPER, supra note 77, at 181−83 (summarizing advances in the field that have
occurred since Festinger’s initial publication).
83

Id. at 182 (formalizing the “New Look” definition of dissonance as “a state of arousal
that occurs when a person acts responsibly to bring about an unwanted consequence”)
(emphasis added). Note that Cooper’s model merely synthesizes concepts that have long
been part of cognitive dissonance theory. Brehm and Cohen, for example, theorized in
1962 that a behavioral cognition gives rise to dissonance only when a subject acts with
volition and commitment to the resulting obverse outcome. See BREHM & COHEN, supra
note 81, at 300.

84

COOPER, supra note 77, at 63−64.
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B. DISSONANCE REDUCTION
[27] Festinger’s observation that aversion increases with dissonance
magnitude implies that individuals, regardless of whether they act alone or
as part of a community, are compelled to find ways to reduce the
magnitude of any cognitive dissonance they experience.85
[28] Festinger and his followers have documented many ways humans
try to reduce cognitive dissonance,86 the majority of which fall into four
general categories:87

85

(i)

pretending that the dissonance does not exist;

(ii)

reducing the dissonance’s perceived importance by
rationalizing or discounting its effect or by

Id. at 7.

86

Recent research suggests that the compulsion to reduce cognitive dissonance extend
even beyond the human race. Researchers at Yale observed capuchin monkeys subjected
to a variation of Festinger’s original 1956 experiments exhibiting what could be
considered dissonance-reduction behavior. John Tierney, Go Ahead, Rationalize.
Monkeys Do It Too., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/06/
science/06tier.html.

87

Theorists have at times organized dissonance-reduction strategies in other ways.
Brehm & Cohen, for example, found five modes:
•

Attitude changes, which may include alterations of one’s opinions
(personal beliefs) and of one’s evaluations (judgments);

•

Selective exposure to information;

•

Selective recall of information;

•

Perceptual distortions; and

•

Behavioral changes.

BREHM & COHEN, supra note 81, at 306−08.
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fabricating counter-beliefs that are consonant with
both cognitions;
(iii)

changing one’s behavioral norms to
dissonance with another cognition; and

reduce

(iv)

taking steps to prevent dissonant cognitions from
arising in the first place, including avoiding possible
sources of dissonance-producing cognitions.88

[29] These responses can produce unexpected and seemingly irrational
results that, without an appreciation of dissonance effects, appear to defy
logic.89
V. TYING IT ALL TOGETHER: THE DISSONANT PARADIGM MODEL
[30] Cognitive dissonance pervades our lives, and academic literature is
filled with efforts to extend its precepts and observations to group
behavior.90 This article strides even further by applying the theory to

88

COGNITIVE DISSONANCE: PROGRESS ON A PIVOTAL THEORY IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
4−5 (Eddie Harmon-Jones & Judson Mills eds., 1999); see also COOPER, supra note 77,
at 7−12 (including an example of how dissonance effects come into play when buying a
car).
89

Infra Part VII.C (explaining how unexpected consequences can occur when seemingly
straightforward attempts to change behavior run afoul of cognitive dissonance effects).
90

BREHM & COHEN, supra note 81, at vii (noting that from the outset, Festinger’s theory
was used to study “a broad range of phenomena, [including] social interaction and mass
behavior”); see, e.g., Sendhil Mullainathan & Ebonya L. Washington, Sticking with Your
Vote: Cognitive Dissonance and Voting (Yale Econ. Applications and Policy Discussion
Paper, Working Paper No. 14, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=904000
(“[T]heories of cognitive dissonance suggest [that] the very act of voting may influence
political attitudes.”); Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some
Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1601(2006) (using
cognitive psychology to analyze the decision-making behavior of prosecutors); Withrow
& Geljon, supra note 34 (applying cognitive dissonance to business-management
controversies); Victor Ricciardi & Helen K. Simon, What Is Behavioral Finance?, 2 BUS.
EDUC. & TECH. J. 1 (2000) (surveying the field of behavioral economics known as
behavioral finance, which applies dissonance theory to the actions and norms of investors
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dissonances between cognitions held by communities that straddle a
paradigm shift.91
[31] It should not be surprising that the laws of cognitive psychology
would apply to mass phenomena like paradigm shifts. Communities
consist of individuals; paradigms are, by definition, clusters of beliefs,
assumptions, and behavioral norms (that is, cognitions) shared by
community members.92 If a disruptive event gives rise to cognitions
dissonant with those of a communal paradigm, similar cognitive
dissonance potentially will confront every individual in the group. Such a
stimulus can, in the aggregate, produce macroeconomic effects if it elicits
common dissonance-reduction responses from a significant proportion of
the community.93
[32] Kuhn, Schumpeter, Christensen, and their followers all use local
terminology to describe aspects of this process. An anomaly, be it an
inexplicable experimental observation (that is, a Kuhnian “crisis”), an
economy-shattering social or technological innovation, or an

and financial markets); William H. Cummings & M. Venkatesan, Cognitive Dissonance
and Consumer Behavior: A Review of the Evidence, 13 J. MARKETING RES. 303 (1976)
(reviewing and summarizing research relating consumer behaviors like brand loyalty to
cognitive dissonance theory); BREHM & COHEN, supra note 81, at 270−85 (using
cognitive dissonance theory to interpret the results of 1960s-era desegregation efforts); id.
at 286−97 (applying dissonance theory to analyze brainwashing techniques used on
Korean War POWs); Desmond Ng, Cognitive Dissonance in the Swine Value Chain (text
of presentation made at the Banff Pork Seminar January), 12 ADVANCES IN P ORK
P RODUCTION 105 (2001), available at http://www.banffpork.ca/proc/2001pdf/Chap15Ng.pdf (using cognitive dissonance to explain differences in perceptions among
competitors and end-users in the U.S. and Canadian markets for swine genetic products).
91

The scope of the model described here is limited to controversies that occur within a
paradigm shift, but the author contends that it is applicable to any controversy where
adversaries, whether individuals or groups, hail from communities within different
paradigms, and he plans to explore this proposition in future articles.
92

KUHN, supra note 18, at 176 (“A paradigm is what members of a community share,
and, conversely, a scientific community consists of men who share a paradigm.”).

93

Id.
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entrepreneurial business model that renders established industries
obsolete, destabilizes a traditional paradigm by creating cognitive
dissonance in the minds of individuals who share that paradigm.94
[33] Community members seek to reduce such dissonance with an
urgency that increases with the magnitude of the dissonance.95 These
efforts manifest as combinations of the standard dissonance-reduction
strategies previously discussed.96
Minor dissonances may be
accommodated without drastic steps, but anomalies that strike to the heart
of a shared paradigm drive a community to more extreme action.97

94

The parallels among these theories run deeper than this, but addressing them as
comprehensively as they deserve is beyond the scope of this introductory article. Kuhn,
for example, described community responses to scientific crises that mimic classic
cognitive dissonance reduction behavior. Id. at 78-79 (stating that when scientists
encounter an anomaly that leads to results obverse to those predicted by a traditional
paradigm, “[t]hey will devise numerous articulations and ad hoc modifications of their
theory to eliminate any apparent conflict”). Kuhn’s work also mirrors Festinger’s
observations about dissonance magnitude when it acknowledges that the greater degree
of “tension” between more dissimilar paradigms can drive community members to more
extreme responses, even including willingness “to desert science because of their
inability to tolerate crisis.” Id. Aversion to dissonance was so central to Kuhn’s thesis
that it spawned the analogous concept of “the essential tension,” which arises when a
community member must work, at least occasionally, within an established paradigm
despite the discomforting conflict between that paradigm and an anomaly that it cannot
explain. Id. Even more significantly, Kuhn acknowledged that non-scientists also
experienced this aversive tension, mentioning specific examples culled from the arts
community. Id. at 79 n.2 (citing Frank Barron, The Psychology of Imagination, SCI.
AM ., Sept. 1958, at 151, 160).
95

See supra notes 80−81.

96

Kuhn, for example, observed that minor dissonances might be accommodated by
extending a traditional paradigm, by casting the dissonance-causing anomaly in a
different light, or by simply ignoring the dissonance in the hope that some future
community will find a way to resolve it. These responses fit into standard categories of
dissonance-reduction strategies. See supra notes 52 & 88.

97

Supra note 96. In a full-blown paradigm shift, some community members typically
adopt long-term dissonance-reduction strategies like total denial, and the community as a
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[34] A paradigm shift occurs when high-magnitude dissonance makes it
impossible to place anomaly-generated cognitions in consonance with the
traditional paradigm.98 Kuhn notes that in such cases, old and new
paradigms
are
not
merely
different—they
are
generally
99
incommensurable.
That is, they incorporate assumptions and basic
definitions so irreconcilable that one cannot even find common
benchmarks with which to compare them.100 Once this occurs, community
members are generally left with dissonance-reduction options that permit
only the adoption of a better-fitting worldview—and the migration to a
new paradigm.101
[35] These are the general conditions, long studied and well understood
from a variety of perspectives, to which the arguments in this article apply.
Social psychologists and economists, like most scientists, raise an
eyebrow at theories that are contrived post hoc and are not founded on
empirical data derived from blind, peer-reviewed studies.102 But the

whole may not shift to a new paradigm until a large portion of the original community
retires or dies out. Supra note 41 and accompanying text.
98

Supra note 43. This article will use a shorthand to describe such conflicting
worldviews as “dissonant paradigms.”
99

Supra note 46.

100

KUHN, supra note 18, at 149.

101

One fact agreed upon by all the theorists discussed in this article is that once a
disruption has spawned a new (and incommensurable) paradigm, the paradigm shift
cannot be stopped. See supra notes 47−51, 64, 67; see also CHRISTENSEN, supra note 20
(asserting that companies that try to use traditional management techniques to halt the
progress of disruptive technologies cannot succeed).
102

BREHM AND COHEN, supra note 81, at 312−13 (noting that a theory can be confirmed
by its ability to predict experimental outcomes, but merely showing that it is consistent
with prior observed phenomena is at best persuasive evidence of its validity, and
specifically stating that “after [an] experiment is over, anything that occurred can be
interpreted as dissonance reduction, whether or not it was seen as a possible mode
beforehand”). Festinger brings up related concerns before gingerly extending his
theoretical framework to communities that consist of individuals that experience identical
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liberties taken here in synthesizing the dissonant-paradigm model are
hardly unprecedented. Researchers have long sought and found parallels
between dissonance and macroeconomic phenomena103 and Kuhn’s
observations about paradigm shifts have routinely been applied to extrascientific communities.104 Although new to the legal world, the rationale
and methodology that underlie this derivation should be familiar to readers
grounded in fields like psychology and economics.
VI. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF PARADIGMATIC DISSONANCE
A. SONY V. UNIVERSAL
[36] Despite its apparent novelty, the dissonant paradigm model is
hardly disconnected from mainstream jurisprudential thought. There is
little reason that a theory rooted in neoclassical economics and cognitive
dissonance—doctrines that have been successfully extended to many of
the social sciences105—would fail to find relevance in an area of the law
that clearly intersects with macroeconomics and group psychology.106

dissonances. But his reservations are not daunting enough to stop him from proceeding.
See FESTINGER, supra note 9, at 234.
103

See, e.g., Withrow & Geljon, supra note 34; Mullainathan & Washington, supra
note 90 (providing a sampling of such studies).
104

See, e.g., CHRISTENSEN, supra note 20, at xxv (supplementing the book’s detailed
analyses of several business-community paradigm shifts with a table listing two dozen
more); Tim O’Reilly, Open Source Paradigm Shift, http://www.oreillynet.com/
pub/a/oreilly/tim/articles/paradigmshift_0504.html (extending the concept of paradigm
shifts to the computer industry, specifically citing the introduction of the IBM PC as an
example and predicting a shift to open-source software); John C. Harrison, Do You
Suffer
from
Paradigm
Paralysis?,
http://www.mnsu.edu/comdis/kuster/
Infostuttering/Paradigmparalysis.html (describing a new paradigm within which the
medical community may better understand the phenomenon of stuttering).

105

See, e.g., Part III and note 85.

106

Macroeconomics is the branch of economics that studies the overall working of a
national economy.
The Free Dictionary, Definition of Macroeconomics,
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/macroeconomics (last visited Oct. 14, 2009). Social
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[37] Consider, for example, a dissonance-informed analysis of the
Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
City Studios, Inc.107 There, Universal Studios and Disney Productions,
which owned copyrights on television shows and feature films broadcast
by television networks, claimed that Sony contributed to large-scale
infringement by selling videocassette recorders (VCRs) that let viewers
“time-shift” (that is, record and store for later viewing) their copyrighted
content.108
[38] Commercial-supported over-the-air television was still the
industry’s dominant business model when the case reached the Supreme
Court.109 But this paradigm had already been disrupted110 by consumer
videotape technology that allowed millions of viewers to consume TV
programming more efficiently by choosing viewing times convenient to
them.111
[39] Cast in terms of paradigmatic dissonance, this controversy
becomes a straightforward contest between shared worldviews on opposite
sides of a paradigm shift. As is generally the case, the local legal system

psychology is the branch of human psychology that deals with the behavior of groups and
the influence of social factors on the individual. The Free Dictionary, Definition of
Group Psychology, http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Group+psychology
(last visited Oct. 14, 2009).
107

464 U.S. 417 (1984).

108

Id. at 421−23.

109

Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, History of Cable Television,
http://www.ncta.com/About/About/HistoryofCableTelevision.aspx (last visited Oct. 14,
2009) (noting that cable and satellite television did not become popular until after
passage of the 1984 Cable Act).
110

VCRs Achieve 30% Market Penetration, DISCOUNT STORE NEWS, Feb. 17, 1986,
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m3092/is_/ai_4138144 (citing a report by the
Electronic Industries Association’s Consumer Electronics Group that 7.6 million units
were sold in 1984 alone).
111

See Sony, 464 U.S. at 421.
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at the time held the perspective of the industry’s traditional real-time
broadcast paradigm.112 The studios thus urged the Court to apply strict
statutory construction to the Copyright Act.113 Within that paradigm, noninfringing “fair use” of copyrighted content was limited to a small number
of enumerated instances subject to a statutory four-part test.114 This short
list did not include time-shifting entire programs for personal use.115
[40] Time-shifting disrupted the traditional paradigm by transferring
temporal control over content consumption from the networks to
consumers. This threatened a business model that relied upon carefully
constructed programming schedules to maximize ratings and advertising
revenue.116 More alarming to the plaintiffs, the VCR made it easy for
consumers to share and distribute recorded programs without copyright
owners’ consent, strip out or fast-forward past commercials, view
recorded shows multiple times, and otherwise control and manipulate
content in ways that previously had not been possible.117
[41] These capabilities spawned cognitions alien to the traditional
paradigm and led to widespread adoption118 of behavioral norms (that is,

112

See SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 7, at 143. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 101−1332
(2006).
113

Justice Blackmun affirmed the plaintiffs’ interpretation in a strongly worded dissent.
See Sony, 464 U.S. at 457 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). His opinion is an illustration of
Schmidt’s “material law is king” scenario, wherein adjudicators determine legality
without considering a new-paradigm community’s motivations and probable responses to
strict-constructionist remedies. SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 7, at 143.
114

17 U.S.C. § 107.

115

See id. (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching . . ., scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of
copyright.”).
116

See Sony, 464 U.S. at 452−53.

117

Id. (describing reasons why most of these fears should be found groundless).

118

Supra note 110.
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time-shifting) that did not fall within the plaintiffs’ definition of fair use.
The home-taping community’s commonality of experience ensured that
these cognitions and dissonances were a group phenomena.119
[42] Cognitive dissonance theory teaches that viewers faced with such
disruptive technology and its aversive consequences would likely try to
reduce their dissonance by denying to themselves the existence of any
conflict, by fabricating consonance-restoring cognitions (such as the belief
that time-shifting is a valid new type of fair use), or by taking steps to
prevent the creation of cognitions potentially dissonant with the traditional
paradigm (for example, by refusing to make unauthorized recordings or
even to own a VCR).120
[43] Among viewers who could not resist the allure of the VCR, the
most probable strategy would thus be to devise some rationale for
deeming time-shifting morally or legally legitimate. Furthermore, because
the VCR threatened to disrupt a traditional worldview at a fundamental
level, these cognitions would have likely been only one component of a
comprehensive, internally consistent set of behavioral norms, beliefs, and
assumptions—in other words, an entire paradigm—that better
accommodated anomalies created by VCR technology.121
[44] Kuhn, Christensen, and the evolutionary economists agree that it is
generally futile, and even undesirable, to obstruct a new paradigm that
more efficiently addresses a disruptive anomaly.122 Here it was too late to
simply ban the VCR after millions of users had adopted the new timeshifting paradigm. But, it would have been equally difficult for a mere
plurality to endorse unrestricted mass copying of protected content in a

119

See supra notes 91−97 and accompanying text.

120

See supra notes 87−88 and accompanying text. These responses fall into the general
categories of dissonance-reduction strategies predicted by Festinger and his followers.
121

See supra note 92.

122

See supra Part III.A−C and note 45; see also KUHN, supra note 18, at 176.
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way that might be interpreted as subverting centuries of copyright history
and tradition.
[45] The Court ultimately resolved the conflict by adopting the standard
dissonance-reduction strategy of fabricating a new cognition that
reconciles disparate paradigms.123
Refusing to hold home taping
infringement per se, it devised a rationale for extending the “fair use”
defense to the practice of time-shifting an entire program for noncommercial use.124 And without an underlying act of direct infringement,
the traditional legal system could not deem the defendants’ act of selling
VCRs to be contributory infringement.125
[46] The Sony Court found support for this position by noting that the
plaintiffs had been unable to show nontrivial harm and that other content
providers were uninterested in protecting their content from timeshifting.126 VCR technology thus offered substantial non-infringing uses
that would be lost to the public should video recorders be banned—
justification in the Court’s eyes for declaring time-shifting to be a new
type of fair use.127
[47] Notwithstanding its inconsistency with precedent, this holding
supported, through a process of extrapolation, the studios’ contention that
existing copyright law should be strictly enforced. The Court effectively
created a third paradigm that reduced the dissonance between the

123

See supra note 88 and accompanying text.

124

Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).

125

Contributory copyright infringement requires actively inducing, causing, or materially
contributing to, or providing goods or means necessary to help another party directly
infringe. Without direct infringement, there can be no contributory infringement. See
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 851 (9th ed. 2009).

126

Sony, 464 U.S. at 446−47. The Court observed that, because the plaintiffs owned only
a minority of copyrighted broadcast content, their competitors had “created a substantial
market for a paradigmatic non-infringing use of [time-shifting VCRs].” Id. at 447 n.28.
127

Id. at 454.
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Copyright Act’s infringement rules and the new-paradigm cognition that
time-shifting is neither morally nor legally wrong. It allowed the
paradigm shift generally to run its course, but only so long as time-shifters
adhered to fair use limits now read into the Copyright Act.128
[48] In true Kuhnian fashion, unfettered VCR technology eventually
inspired new, more efficient business models and time-shifting
technologies that ultimately benefited all parties.129 Not only did the VCR
help create the enormously profitable movie-rental market, but it also
benefited the public by paving the way for methods of content delivery
that would more efficiently and effectively satisfy consumer needs than
traditional broadcast television.130
[49] Most significantly, the Court arrived at its holding through
conventional judicial reasoning,131 demonstrating that established
jurisprudential standards and methodologies can be fully compatible with
the dissonant paradigm model.

128

Even the Sony holding would not save time-shifting technologies that, for example,
caused material economic harm to content owners and had no other non-infringing uses.
Id. at 449.
129

Examples include the video tape and disc rental industries, personal video recorders
(such as TiVo products), networked media-streaming appliances, video-on-demand
applications, and online information-delivery services.

130

These included settop and computer-based video-recording, video-on-demand
services, and DVD and Blu-ray discs. And while the Sony decision did not, strictly
speaking, address the legality of videotape rental, it certainly did facilitate the growth of
the VCR market, without which video rentals might never have become viable.
131

Albeit, perhaps, with paradigmatic dissonance lurking as a Holmesian “inarticulate
major premise.” See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV.
457, 465 (1897) (“Behind the logical form lies a judgment as to the relative worth and
importance of competing legislative grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious
judgment, it is true, and yet the very root and nerve of the whole proceeding.”); see also
Anne C. Dailey, Holmes and the Romantic Mind, 48 DUKE L.J. 429, 447−56 (1999)
(describing Holmes’s view of the relationship between “Unconscious Ideas and Legal
Rules”).
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B. DISSONANCE AND MODERN JURISPRUDENTIAL THOUGHT
[50] It is one thing to use historic court decisions to illustrate a novel
legal theory, but post hoc analyses neither demonstrate a model’s
predictive value nor integrate it into an established legal framework.
Here, however, there is no need to shoehorn paradigmatic dissonance into
the jurisprudential mainstream. The model clearly claims common
provenance with several prominent schools of legal thought. In particular,
it shares deep roots in neoclassical economics and belief in the primacy of
transactional efficiency and unfettered market forces132
with the
influential Chicago School of the Law and Economics movement.133 One
might even argue that paradigmatic dissonance merely enhances the Law
and Economics model with a set of dissonance-cognizant analytical
tools.134
[51] Both acknowledge that economic forces set the stage for paradigm
shifts and that, despite any concomitant disruption, such forces are
essential components of a healthy, growing economy. But paradigmatic
dissonance more completely explains less obvious motivations of
adversaries entangled in such shifts and better predicts the counterintuitive
ways parties may react to economically rational remedies. While
paradigmatic dissonance fits snugly within the larger framework of the
Law and Economics model, it introduces additional factors necessary to
accurately compare relative efficiencies and transaction costs and to

132

This connection should hardly be surprising since the Law and Economics movement
generally builds upon the same neoclassical model of economics that underlies
paradigmatic dissonance. See supra Part III.B.

133

Black’s Law Dictionary defines “Law and Economics” as “[a] discipline advocating
the economic analysis of the law, whereby legal rules are subjected to a cost-benefit
analysis to determine whether a change from one legal rule to another will increase or
decrease allocative efficiency and social wealth.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 963 (9th
ed. 2009). Although beyond the scope of this introductory paper, the author suggests that
the complex relationship between paradigmatic dissonance and the Law and Economics
school is a topic worthy of further exploration.
134

That is, by finding linkage between the principles of neoclassical economics and of
cognitive dissonance theory.
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predict the conduct of communities interacting within a transitioning
market.
[52] The Chicago School has been criticized for mercilessly applying
economic criteria to even equitable disputes, a perspective that opponents
claim ignores the importance of distributive justice.135 Paradigmatic
dissonance addresses this concern by softening the neoclassical model’s
stark reliance on market infallibility with Humanist qualifications found in
cognitive psychology.
[53] Consider again the Sony decision. There, the plurality, although
concerned with preserving the studios’ copyrights, was unwilling to
criminalize millions of Americans merely because they chose a more
efficient consumption method. The Court intrinsically understood the
futility of trying to suppress a paradigm that had been endorsed by the
mass market—a tactic that, even if successful, risked opening niches for
less-efficient and even more disruptive innovations.136 In giving relatively
free rein to economic natural selection, the Sony decision could not help
but facilitate efficient business models that would better serve the public
good.

135

See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Law-and-Economics from the Perspective of Critical
Legal Studies, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 465
(Peter Newman ed., 1998) (“.The . . . proposal that courts adopt [efficiency] as the
criterion of decision between different possible legal rules is a bad idea, practically
unworkable, incoherent on its own terms, and . . . open to . . . ideological manipulation . .
. .”).

136

This is exactly what happened when the Ninth Circuit shut down the Napster peer-topeer music file sharing service. Rather than save the record industry by eliminating
unauthorized online file sharing, terminating Napster gave rise to decentralized file
sharing services that have proven nearly impossible to control. See A & M Records, Inc.
v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Jeffrey R. Armstrong, Sony,
Napster, and Aimster: An Analysis of Dissimilar Application of the Copyright Law to
Similar Technologies, 13 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 1, 13 (2003); SCHMIDT ET AL.,
supra note 7, at 85−86, 90.
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[54] Paradigmatic dissonance and the Chicago school share ground in
other ways.
Richard Posner,137 for example, reveals a Kuhnian
perspective to Law and Economics theory when he describes how
evolutionary market forces, not the whims of government or some
objectively knowable benchmarks, ultimately determine the “truth” of new
ideas.138
[55] Like the theorists from whose work the dissonant-paradigm model
is derived, Posner explains that communities select cognitions (and, by
analogy to the work of H.L.A. Hart,139 ascribe power to the corresponding
legal system) when those cognitions better explain observations and
phenomena that are anomalous to a traditional paradigm:
[W]hen we say that an idea (the earth revolves
around the sun) is correct[,] we mean that all or most of the
knowledgeable consumers have accepted (“bought”) it.
(Even in science—the traditional domain of objective
validity—ideas are discarded not because they are
demonstrated to be false but because competing ideas give
better answers to the questions with which the scientists of
the day are most concerned.)140
[56] Posner’s statements also echo another tenet of paradigmatic
dissonance: the impossibility of protecting an established business model

137

Posner, who sits on the Seventh Circuit and is Senior Lecturer at the University of
Chicago Law School, has been described as “the most influential and significant theorist
and advocate of the law and economics approach.” Richard E. Levy, The Tie that Binds:
Some Thoughts About the Rule of Law, Law and Economics, Collective Action Theory,
Reciprocity, and Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 901, 904
(2008).
138

Excepting, of course, “purely deductive propositions such as the Pythagorean
theorem.” RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 541 (2d ed. 1977).
139

Discussed infra note 147.

140

POSNER, supra note 138, at 541.
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by suppressing a more efficient paradigm.141 By corollary, Law and
Economics, like the dissonant paradigm model, acknowledges that
government should, whenever possible, resist the urge to shield vested
interests in heavy-handed ways that interfere with technological progress
or judge innovations solely by using standards rooted in traditional
paradigms and legal systems.
If competition among ideas is the method by which
truth is established, the suppression of an idea on the
ground that it is false is irrational. An idea is false only if
rejected in the marketplace, and if rejected there is no
occasion to suppress it. For the government to declare an
idea to be “true” when it has suppressed the competing
ideas would be comparable to its declaring a brand of beer
to be the “most popular” brand when the sale of the other
brands had been suppressed.”142
[57] Posner further notes that even the venerable “Hand rule” of tort
law,143 familiar to almost every first-year law student, fits within this
framework by requiring lawmakers and adjudicators to consider the
relative effects of their actions on both parties to a dispute.144 A remedy
that enacts great penalties upon time-shifters without demonstrating

141

See, e.g., CHRISTENSEN, supra note 20, at 266 (claiming that companies that use
traditional management techniques to halt the progress of disruptive technologies cannot
succeed because such practices work only with sustaining technologies. The “more
productive route . . . is to understand the natural laws that apply to disruptive
technologies and to use them to create new markets and new products.”).
142

POSNER, supra note 138, at 541−42.

143

Id. at 542 (“The courts, [Judge Learned Hand] wrote, must in each case ‘ask whether
the gravity of the “evil” [i.e., if the instigation succeeds], discounted by its improbability,
justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.’”).

144

Id. at 545−46 (using the example of pornography, where restricting the public display
of pornography on billboards would have a relatively low cost for pornography
consumers, but failing to enact such a law would have a much higher cost to the public at
large; the reverse is true for a law that completely bans pornography).
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equivalent benefits to content owners would be based upon a biased
analysis that ignores one side of the economic equation. This is the lesson
of Sony; one that is still being relearned to this day.
[58] One can find connections to paradigmatic dissonance in other
schools of jurisprudential thought. H.L.A. Hart,145 for example, tempered
the austere Austinian view of Positivism146 by identifying “secondary
rules” that legitimize legal power and define how it is allocated and
applied in society. The most basic tenet is the Rule of Recognition, which
holds that law gains validity, not from intrinsic authority of the sovereign,
but from the recognition and acceptance of those subject to its power.147
This concept foreshadows the fundamental principle of paradigmatic
dissonance that it is a community’s market-driven choices, regardless of
the efforts of government, that legitimize a local legal system and its
accompanying paradigm.
[59] From another perspective, the dissonant-paradigm model may be
viewed as a straightforward extension of the Sociological school of legal
thought, which considers differences between social groups on either side
of a legal controversy.148 Instead of defining law as what the courts or a
government says it is, both doctrines assume a pragmatic stance that

145

Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart (1907−92) was a British philosopher and professor of
jurisprudence at the University of Oxford, where he held the esteemed Regius Chair for
Jurisprudence from 1952 through 1969. See Tony Honoré, Legal Philosophy in Oxford,
http://www.law.ox.ac.uk/jurisprudence/hart.shtml (last visited Oct. 14, 2009).
146

Austinian Positivism teaches that legal rules are valid because they are enacted by an
existing political authority or accepted as binding in a given society, not because they are
grounded in morality or in natural law. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 978 (9th ed.
2009) (definition of “legal positivism”).
147

NEIL MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART 33 (2d ed. 2008) (stating that a legal system is valid
in a particular community only if “the bulk of the inhabitants of [that community agree
to] comply with the primary rules requiring them to do certain things and omit others”).
148

See generally MATHIEU DEFLEM, SOCIOLOGY OF LAW: VISIONS OF A SCHOLARLY
TRADITION (2008) (describing and tracing the history of the Law and Sociology
movement).
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strives to balance competing values of adversarial groups that belong to
different demographic and social classes.149
[60] These parallels are not merely hand-waving efforts to portray
synchronicities as correlations; they are evidence that legal models do not
develop in a vacuum. The same broadly applicable doctrines that inform
paradigmatic dissonance could not have helped but influence other major
schools of jurisprudential thought.
Paradigmatic dissonance is a
multidisciplinary synthesis of widely accepted theories, not an
unprecedented leap. And its unique vantage point is an extension of,
rather than an alternative to, mainstream legal thought.
VII. THE ROLE OF LAWMAKERS AND ADJUDICATORS
A. THE ILLUSION OF RATIONALISM
[61] Paradigmatic dissonance need not be the only modality used to
analyze controversies that arise during paradigm shifts, but failing to
consider it can result in an imperfect analysis and unintended
consequences.150 One problem is that mainstream Rationalist analysis
may not reveal the underlying motivations of parties on either side of a
transition. Rationalism, for example, generally presumes that individuals’
responses to external events follow logically from their beliefs—not the

149

See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954) (advocating
desegregation by citing numerous studies that show detrimental psychological and
sociological effects on segregated black children).

150

See supra note 89 and accompanying text; infra Part VII.C (presenting a brief example
of the often-unexpected ways that individuals respond to cognitive dissonance).
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other way around.151 This presumption, however, produces an incomplete
picture of paradigm-shift dynamics.152
[62] Rationalist legal analysis also fails to acknowledge fundamental
characteristics of the shift itself. In his exhaustive examination of the
conflicts between the recording industry and the online file-sharing
community, economist Aernout Schmidt noted that, rather than treating
the emergence of disruptive entrepreneurial markets as migrations to new
paradigms, mainstream legal analysis assumes the viewpoint of the “local
legal system.”153 Such an approach determines legality, but never looks
under the hood. It fails to address the questions of why one community
inexplicably violates the law in an otherwise-stable legal system while
another clings to economically inefficient business models within that
established system.154 Because existing laws are likely wedded to
traditional paradigms, Schmidt argues, Rationalist analysis encourages a
one-sided perspective that casts disruptive technology and new-paradigm
communities as villains.155 Furthermore, although mainstream legal

151

Rationalism assumes that pure reason and logic are the ultimate source of truth.
Britannica Online Encyclopedia, Rationalism, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/
topic/492034/rationalism (last visited Oct. 14, 2009). Legal analyses that blindly
embrace this philosophy do not always anticipate counterintuitive dissonance effects that
arise during paradigm-shift controversies. See, e.g., infra Part VII.C.

152

See Mullainathan & Washington, supra note 90 (“[C]ognitive dissonance suggest[s] . .
. that behavior may shape preferences.”).
153

See SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 7, at 143.

154

Id. at 144. These issues are also a primary focus of Christensen’s “disruptive
innovation” thesis. See generally CHRISTENSEN, supra note 20 (describing how
established businesses and innovators interact from a market perspective in Part I).
155

SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 7, at 143−44 (observing that this rule applies generally,
with disruptive technologies and new-paradigm businesses often declared responsible for
“major legal and economic problems” arising in areas like “intellectual property law
enforcement[, and] contract, liability, competition[,] and privacy law”); see also Withrow
& Geljon, supra note 34 (defining the dissonance effect “Fundamental Attribution Error”
as occurring when one party blames “the other’s perceived mistakes on some intrinsic
aspect of that person (e.g., their personality or personal abilities . . .)”).
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analysis frequently assumes that single-mindedly applying current law
during a paradigm shift will foster more efficient business models, this
rarely happens.156
[63] Another failure of Rationalism is its assumption that more severe
penalties have greater deterrent effect upon premeditated actions.157 This
may make sense when perpetrators share values and behavioral norms
with the local legal system.158 But when disputes arise between
communities defined by incommensurable paradigms, simply increasing
penalties that favor one worldview over the other can produce
counterintuitive results.159 Dissonance theory teaches that the most
effective way to use punishment to discourage behavior is to inflict the
mildest possible penalty capable of influencing underlying beliefs.160
Anything stronger will strengthen those beliefs and make the proscribed
behavior more attractive.161 Even more problematic, the principle of
156

SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 7, at 144.

157

Rationalists presume that behavior is a logical response to stimuli, and thus, in
general, deterrents deter, incentives entice, and people act in a rational manner. See
Britannica Online Encyclopedia, Rationalism, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/
topic/492034/rationalism (last visited Oct. 15, 2009).
158

Modern homicide law is generally considered logical and effective when applied to
perpetrators who hold a paradigm similar to the one upon which the law is founded. This
paradigm includes beliefs that killing a person is a punishable act; that premeditated
killings are worse than those committed in the heat of passion; that both are more
deserving of punishment than causing an accidental death; and that capital punishment or
life imprisonment have greater deterrent effect than would a few years in prison. See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt. 1 (1980).
159

See, e.g., COOPER, supra note 77, at 19−21 (discussing clinical evidence that
increasing punishment for proscribed behavior can create dissonance effects that make
those activities more attractive); id. at 24 (describing a classic experiment where more
severe punishment inflicted upon children ordered not to play with attractive toys had
less effect upon the children’s cognition that the toys were desirable).
160

Id. at 24.

161

Id.; cf. id. at 18−19 (citing BREHM & COHEN, supra note 81, at 73−78 (presenting an
inverse corollary based on a 1961 experiment where Yale students were paid varying
amounts of money to write favorable essays about unpopular local police; students paid
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vicarious dissonance, which states that individuals can experience the
aversive effect of other people’s dissonant cognitions,162 makes it likely
that applying an overly harsh remedy to even one community member can
have undesired effects on the entire group.163
B. WHAT THE LAW CAN LEARN FROM PARADIGMATIC DISSONANCE
1. LEGAL REMEDIES
[64] It is beyond the scope of this article to propose hard-edged
solutions to specific social problems.164 But it is certainly possible to
suggest general points of departure from which theorists, lawmakers, and
adjudicators can develop fact-specific analyses and remedies.
[65] In an unpublished 2003 dissertation, economists Jason Withrow
and Mark Geljon applied Kuhn’s and Festinger’s models to business and
management problems, analyzing them as dissonances between
contrasting worldviews.165 The authors defined three general classes of
remedies:

the least experienced the greatest changes in attitude toward the police, thereby
confirming an inverse relationship between the intensity of the external stimulus and its
effect on dissonance)).
162

See id. at 119−23.

163

Id. This principle is illustrated infra in the music-industry example of Part VII.C and
is extrapolated to the concept of “vicarious hypocrisy” in COOPER, supra note 77, at
178−80.
164

In fact, it is inadvisable to consider such a task without undertaking an exhaustive
analysis of the facts in each case.

165

See Withrow & Geljon, supra note 34.
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(i)

Strategic Approaches that foster the development of
a third paradigm that is consonant with the
worldviews of both parties;166

(ii)

Tactical Solutions that reduce dissonance by
facilitating the parties’ understanding of each
other’s worldviews and by encouraging them to
accept the fact that their conduct is rooted in
different assumptions and beliefs;167 and

(iii)

Operational Cures that work to build bridges
between worldviews when creating a new paradigm
is not possible.168

[66] Any combination of these three approaches may give rise to
effective remedies, but cures must be fashioned with an understanding of
166

Id. This is the type of approach taken in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., where the Court’s refusal to regulate home-recording devices facilitated the
creation of the video-rental industry. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417, 427 (1984).

167

Withrow & Geljon, supra note 34. One such remedy is the record labels’ recent
decision to sell freely reproducible music online. Even if the music industry’s paradigm
does not include its customers’ cognition that they have the right to port purchased music
to multiple devices at will, this new business model acknowledges that such a cognition
exists and recognizes that it must be incorporated into its business model. Likewise, even
if music-consumers do not hold a cognition that they have the duty to pay for online
music, the labels’ good-faith offering of unprotected downloads may reduce dissonance
enough to make these services palatable. See Daniel Kreps, T.I. Illegal Seizure Ruling
Postponed, Sony/BMG Goes DRM-Free, Led Zeppelin Bonnaroo Rumors Inaccurate and
More, ROLLING STONE, Jan. 4, 2008, http://www.rollingstone.com/rockdaily/index.
php/2008/01/04/ti-illegal-seizure-ruling-postponed-sonybmg-goes-drm-free-led-zeppelinroo-rumors-inaccurate-and-more (reporting that holdout Sony/BMG will join the other
major labels, Amazon.com, and iTunes Plus in licensing unprotected MP3 music files
through the Internet).

168

See Withrow & Geljon, supra note 34 (“Accept differences in paradigms and
implement smart ways of dealing with them.”); see also, e.g., infra Part VII.B.1.c
(describing a general class of “bridging” remedies that involve taxing revenues generated
by one business model to support another).
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underlying cognitive dissonances and the specific factors that control their
magnitude.169 This perspective may help explain why regulators have
traditionally favored certain types of solutions to the problems that attend
disruptive innovation:170
(a) THROW TECHNOLOGY AT TECHNOLOGY
[67] Regulate the pace of the shift with incentives that favor
technological controls or innovations that reduce dissonance or make old
paradigms more economically feasible.171
(b) ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
[68] Rather than taking one side, force parties to submit to mediation or
arbitration. This approach can reduce aversion to compromise by coercing
adversaries to adopt otherwise-dissonant cognitions172and can be

169

See BREHM & COHEN, supra note 81, at 302−06 (summarizing the factors controlling
dissonance magnitude that had been reported to date).
170

This list is by no means exhaustive. It describes several general classes of remedies
that boast proven track records, but there are innumerable ways to deal with technologybased disruption, and each solution must be crafted specifically to serve the facts at hand.
Readers are encouraged to glean ideas from the scores of examples, observations, and
findings described in the sources cited here. See, e.g., id.; COOPER, supra note 77;
FESTINGER, supra note 9.
171

The Ninth Circuit ostensibly attempted such a remedy when it ordered the Napster
online file sharing service to implement a content-filtering mechanism that would allow it
to survive so long as it could guarantee its ability to pay the music industry royalties for
all copyrighted content downloaded from its servers. This appeared on its face to be an
incentive to create technology that would allow old- and new-paradigm business models
to coexist. But many would argue that it was merely a cynical way to side against
Napster, which had little chance of developing the perfect technology required by the
court. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1027 (9th Cir. 2001)
(holding that Napster “bears the burden of policing the system within the limits of the
system”); Record Industry Attacks Napster Filter, BBC NEWS, Mar. 28, 2001,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1246924.stm.
172

See COOPER, supra note 77, at 63 (describing how dissonance occurs only when a
subject undertakes dissonance-causing behavior of her own volition).

40

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XVI, Issue 1

especially effective during an impasse if one or both parties cannot afford
to lose face through concession.173
(c) TAX THE POOR AND GIVE TO THE RICH
[69] When disruptive innovation threatens a traditional industry with
undue hardship, it may be possible to ease the pain by using fees and taxes
to shift capital. This solution changes the relative efficiency of the two
paradigms, giving the besieged industry time to catch its breath without
unduly suppressing innovation.
It may also reduce both sides’
dissonances by creating a bridging mechanism through which each
acknowledges, supports, and profits from the other’s efforts.174
(d) GIVE THE MARKET FREE REIN
[70] In some cases, the government has simply refused to step in,
allowing survival-of-the-fittest market forces to exert de facto regulation.
This may seem harsh, but it was just such a ruling in Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. that, despite fears that home
videotaping would devastate the film and television industries, instead

173

Consider how much healthier the music industry might be today had the A&M v.
Napster court ordered it to negotiate joint ownership of Napster and work together in
good faith to transform the site into a legal and profitable downloading service.
Napster’s founders were clearly amenable to a merger but the labels could not risk
alienating their old-paradigm business partners, such as CD retailers and distributors, by
voluntarily undertaking such an effort. Had they been forced to do so under court order,
however, they might have been relieved of much of that pressure. See A&M Records,
239 F.3d 1004; Linda Himelstein, Napster’s CEO Splits on a Sour Note,
BUSINESSWEEK.COM, May 14, 2002, http://www.businessweek.com/technology/
content/may2002/tc20020514_1069.htm (reporting that co-founder Shawn Fanning and
Napster CEO Konrad Hilbers resigned in anger with the collapse of a deal to sell the
service to media giant Bertelsmann).
174

Congress adopted this approach when refereeing the anti-piracy debate between the
music and consumer-electronics industries created by the advent of personal digital
recording devices. Its solution was to enact the Audio Home Recording Act, 17 U.S.C.
§§ 1001−10 (2006), which imposed taxes on digital recorders and media that funded
compensatory royalties to content publishers. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001−1010 (2006).
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gave Hollywood an enormous new revenue stream by facilitating the
creation of the prerecorded videotape aftermarket.175
2. A DOZEN RULES
[71] Complex social problems require sophisticated solutions that make
sense from multiple perspectives. When addressing controversies that
span incommensurate worldviews, the dissonant-paradigm model, even if
it is not the only theory employed, can add depth to a legal analysis.176
This section summarizes a dozen of the more useful principles, some of
which have been alluded to above, that emerge from the extension of this
model to real-world controversies.
(a) THE HARDER YOU PUSH, THE MORE YOU FAIL
[72] Cognitive dissonance theory states that deterrents are most
effective when they inflict the minimal amount of punishment necessary to
alter undesired behavior. Greater levels of deterrence actually strengthen
cognitions that reduce dissonance with the unwanted conduct.177
(b) SELL TIME, BUT NOT TOO MUCH
[73] Sometimes an industry devastated by disruptive innovation might
have been able to compete had it been allowed more time to react. In such
cases, regulators may best serve the public interest with temporary
measures that merely slow a paradigm shift, rather than try to stop it.

175

Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (refusing to
acquiesce to the MPAA’s demands that videocassette recorders be banned); see also
Dave Owen, The Betamax vs VHS Format War, MEDIACOLLEGE.COM, Jan. 8, 2008,
http://www.mediacollege.com/video/format/compare/betamax-vhs.html.
176

See, e.g., supra Part VI.A; infra Part VII.C.

177

See supra notes 160−61 and accompanying text.
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(c) BALANCE THE SCALES OF JUSTICE
[74] Regulators’ highest priority should be to facilitate progress. The
best way to do this is to ensure that innovative technology is allowed to
deliver the greatest benefit to the greatest number.178 This goal must,
however, be tempered by fairness. It is in the public interest to give
established industries a fair chance to compete on the new playing field.
They should neither have the power to crush emerging models arbitrarily
nor to lock out innovative competitors long enough to steal their ideas.
But they should be allowed to protect their investments against those who
would use new technology to plunder their assets.
(d) UNDERSTAND THE SCOPE OF THE
NEED BEFORE TAILORING A CURE
[75] Evolutionary economist Samuelson’s Neoclassical Synthesis
theory identified economic urgency as the primary factor controlling how
aggressively government should intervene during a paradigm shift.179
Despite the urgings of lobbyists and other special interests, lawmakers
must consider the imminence and the degree of disruption when deciding
how quickly and how forcefully to respond. Aggressive response to
disruptions that are distant in time can themselves cause disruptive
consequences.180

178

A common theme running through the derivation of the dissonant-paradigm model has
been the crucial role that paradigm shifts play in enabling social, economic, or scientific
progress. See, e.g., supra notes 18, 48−49, 55−56, 61, 63, 67 and accompanying text.
179

See generally PAUL A. SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (enlarged
ed. 1983) (applying the Solow-Swan model to cases where governments are called upon
to address the disruptive effects of technological innovation, defining parameters that
specify the proper degree of governmental intervention in such situations, and asserting
that governments should consider only the immediacy and urgency of harm caused by the
disruption when deciding how aggressively to act).

180

See infra Part VII.B.2.f.
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(e) CRYSTALS AND MUD
[76] The legal system’s initial response to an emerging paradigm is
generally to shore up old-paradigm statutes through extension, exception,
and creative interpretation. It may not be until volumes of case law and
statutory tweaking reduce the original statute to all patch and no rubber
that government is driven to pass comparatively straightforward
legislation that better accommodates the new paradigm.181 The timing of
such overhauls can significantly alter the social and economic impact of a
paradigm shift and the relative fortunes of parties on either side. If
enacted too soon, lawmakers may not be able to fully identify the evolving
paradigm or understand its implications.182 But if too late, obsolete laws
may be exploited to suppress innovation or remain on the books long after
they have ceased to serve any purpose.
(f) NEW PARADIGMS CANNOT BE ANTICIPATED
[77] One issue in which theorists from Kuhn through Christensen agree
is that there is no way to anticipate the nature and implications of a new
business model, paradigm, or technology before it emerges. Pre-emptive
strikes on disruptive innovations that exist only in crystal balls are likely
to be at best a waste of resources.183 A better strategy is to monitor early-

181

This cyclical model, developed and applied to property law by Stanford professor
Carol Rose, asserts that statutes begin as hard-edged “crystalline” entities that produce
deterministic results, but are eventually “muddied” in the courts by exceptions and
extension to unforeseen fact patterns. According to Rose, when the muddiness increases
to an unworkable level, the cycle continues with another round of crystallizing
legislation. One can analogize the disruptive effects of technological innovation into
similar cycles, a phenomenon that may in fact occur generally. See Carol M. Rose,
Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 580 (1988).
182

See infra Part VII.B.2.f.

183

See CHRISTENSEN, supra note 20, at 265 (stating the principle that “Markets That
Don’t Exist Can’t Be Analyzed,” which holds that a company that refuses to enter a new
market without first accumulating market data and revenue projections will be
“paralyzed” by disruptive technologies “because they demand data on markets that don’t
yet exist.”); see also, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417 (1984) (where the movie industry attempted to convince the courts to ban a
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warning mechanisms that give regulators and affected communities time
to forge measured responses to disruption.184
(g) REGULATION MUST ACCOUNT FOR THE
NEEDS OF THOSE BEING REGULATED
[78] Laws and regulations that do not accommodate, or even
acknowledge, the needs of the communities they regulate create
adversarial, economically inefficient, and ultimately anti-democratic
relationships between the governing and the governed.185 Legal analyses
and remedies must recognize that when parties violate local statutes. They
may be acting in accord with norms that the law will one day recognize.186
Rationalist solutions that accept the legitimacy of only one party’s
worldview cannot produce equitable remedies tailored to the needs of both
sides.187
(h) SOMETIMES IT IS BEST TO WAIT AND SEE
[79] Regulators always must ask themselves whether it makes more
sense to do nothing than to take steps that could make a bad situation

technology that, not too many years later, spawned a business model that became one of
Hollywood’s most important revenue sources).
184

See CHRISTENSEN, supra note 20, at 143 (“The strategies and plans that managers
formulate . . . should be plans for learning and discovery rather than plans for
execution.”).
185

Mathias Klang, Disruptive Technology: Effects of Technology Regulation on
Democracy 225−27 (Oct. 2, 2006) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Göteborg
University, Dept. of Applied Information Technology), available at http://gupea.ub.gu.se/
dspace/handle/2077/9910; see also MACCORMICK, supra note 147.
186

Klang, supra note 185, at 226 (stating “[t]he process of legislation and control must . .
. involve the needs of the users,” and drawing parallels to engineering design standards
and the requirements of social contracts).
187

See SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 7, at 142−43.
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worse.188 When it is too soon to safely fashion even interim remedies or
when parties to a controversy may yet be persuaded to negotiate on a level
playing field, the best solution may be for government to step aside and, at
least for a time, allow market forces to prevail.
(i) BEHAVIOR CAN CHANGE BELIEFS
[80] Cognitive dissonance theory states that when an individual’s
behavior is inconsistent with a previously held cognition, the resulting
dissonance can compel a change in beliefs or assumptions.189 While it
may be obvious that thoughts can influence behavior, conventional
analyses would not predict the opposite to be true.190
(j) PARADIGM SHIFTS PASS A POINT OF NO RETURN
[81] Lawmakers can try to cushion the catastrophic effects of a
paradigm shift on established businesses. They can throttle its pace
through regulation, and they can use incentives to temporarily funnel
innovation in a particular direction.
But they generally cannot
permanently stop a community from adopting a paradigm that fits its
needs and cannot hope for a good outcome by merely giving entrenched
industries the power to suppress innovation. Economic forces almost
always prevail.191
(k) NOT ALL COGNITIONS ARE CREATED EQUAL
[82] Dissonance-altering remedies produce unexpected consequences
when they prompt a different dissonance-reduction response than they had
188

See, e.g., infra Part VII.C (implying that cognitive dissonance theory reveals that the
more aggressively the RIAA attacks file sharers, the less likely they are to experience
aversion to unauthorized copying); COOPER, supra note 77, at 19−21, 24−25.

189

See Mullainathan & Washington, supra note 90 (reporting experimental results that
show that “cognitive dissonance suggest[s] . . . that behavior may shape preferences”).
190

See id.; see also BREHM & COHEN, supra note 81, at 73−78.

191

See supra note 141.
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intended. The factors that influence this critical decision are related to the
relative importance a person assigns to each cognition. Those that have
greater perceived importance generally produce higher magnitude
dissonance with other cognitions, and the relative importance of
cognitions in a dissonant pair helps determine which one a subject tries
harder to preserve. Furthermore, efforts to modify an individual’s or a
community’s behavior or beliefs by changing the importance of one
cognition may have surprising ripple effects on other cognitions and
dissonances. Thus, remedies undertaken without knowledge of the issues
that influence dissonance-reduction choices pose a greater risk of
unintended consequences.
[83] Modern dissonance theory, for example, holds that it is generally
harder to change behavioral cognitions than it is to alter attitudes.192
Consequently, a remedy that increases the dissonance between a norm of
conduct and an equally strong belief is more likely to change the subject’s
thought processes than her behavior.193
[84] Similarly, when fashioning legal remedies, it is important to realize
that it is easier to alter cognitions about one’s own behavior, often by
merely changing the behavior itself, than it is to change cognitions about
the environment gleaned from one’s own senses.194
[85] Finally, all things being equal, cognitions that correspond to
cultural norms are usually stronger (and more difficult to change) than
personal beliefs.195

192

See COOPER, supra note 77, at 8 (“In general, it is difficult to change a cognition about
one’s behavior. Therefore, when behavior is discrepant from attitudes, the dissonance
caused thereby is usually reduced by changing one’s attitude.”).
193

Id.

194

FESTINGER, supra note 9, at 276.

195

COOPER, supra note 77, at 182 (“[When choosing between] internalized standards of
one’s society, culture, or family, or [the] personal standards . . . generated by what one
thinks of oneself. . . . [T]he playing field . . . tilts toward normative standards unless
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(l) VICARIOUS DISSONANCE
[86] It is possible for individuals to experience dissonance by merely
observing the undesired consequences of others’ behavior. This effect, for
better or worse, leverages the effects of remedies imposed on individuals,
extending their reach throughout the community. This can be an effective
tool when it is not practical to punish or reward the behavior of every
community member. But, it can also compound errors when a modest
remedy produces unintended consequences.196
C. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: A BRIEF EXAMPLE
[87] The surprising outcomes often predicted by cognitive dissonance
theory help explain why many seemingly rational, straightforward legal
remedies produce counterintuitive results. Dissonance theory can thus
help governmental and private entities better comprehend and more
reliably influence individuals’ behavior by more accurately identifying
and characterizing the components of the paradigm they share.197
[88] The recording industry, for example, periodically tries to
discourage unauthorized online file-sharing activity by launching media
campaigns that stress the inequity of enjoying another person’s creative
work without compensation.198 Dissonance theory would characterize
such messages as attempts to reinforce consumers’ presumed belief in fair

something in the environment specifically makes personal standards particularly
accessible.”).
196

See supra note 162 and accompanying text; see also infra Part VII.C.

197

See, e.g., COOPER, supra note 77, at 174 (citing public health policy as an example of
how cognitive dissonance may be “an effective means of inducing changes in both
behavior and attitudes toward greater compliance with positive health messages” and
calling it “one [of the] more effective . . . techniques that health professionals can use to
trigger healthier behaviors”).

198

The Record Industry Association of America (RIAA), Motion Picture Association of
America (MPAA), and the business-software industry’s Business Software Alliance
(BSA) have all launched such advertising campaigns over the last few decades.
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play, and thus increase the magnitude of that cognition’s dissonance with,
and the resulting aversion to, unlawful file-sharing behavior.
[89] This tactic, however, ignores the fact that file-sharing communities
live within a different paradigm than do record labels. It is a mistake to
assume that young Internet music consumers observe any belief,
assumption, or norm of behavior merely because such a cognition falls
within the record industry’s traditional paradigm.
[90] Music file-sharers, for example, do not equate the interests of
faceless record labels with those of recording artists. Many believe that
money paid to major record labels never finds its way into musicians’
pockets and, if anything, assume that record companies routinely and
shamelessly exploit both musicians and consumers.199 The cognition that
unlawful downloading deprives labels of income thus does not easily lead
the file-sharing community to the conclusion that the practice is immoral
or harmful to innocent parties. Therefore, pleas to consider the welfare of
musicians are less likely within the file-sharing community’s paradigm to
increase the magnitude of the dissonance between downloaders’ online
behavioral norms and their belief in fair play.
[91] A better understanding of dissonance and paradigm shifts might
suggest more effective ways to discourage file-sharing behavior. One
strategy would be to cultivate dissonance with the cognition that recording
199

A representative sampling of Stanford law professor and celebrity file-sharing
advocate Lawrence Lessig’s online writings clearly express the disdain that the file
sharing community feels toward the music industry. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig,
Copyrights Rule, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD, Oct. 2, 2000, http://www.lessig.org/
content/standard/0,1902,18964,00.html (“Courts are racing to enjoin alleged violators of
copyright law, taking no account of the effects on the development of the Internet.”);
Lawrence Lessig, Copyright Thugs, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD, May 7, 2001,
http://www.lessig.org/content/standard/0,1902,24208,00.html
(“[P]reventing
piracy
doesn’t mean you can punish researchers.”); Lawrence Lessig, Just Compensation, THE
INDUSTRY STANDARD, Apr. 9, 2001, http://www.lessig.org/content/standard/0,1902,
23401,00.html (“Congress should help artists get paid without delivering the Internet into
the hands of the big labels.”); Lawrence Lessig, The Limits of Copyright, THE INDUSTRY
STANDARD, Jun. 19, 2000, http://www.lessig.org/content/standard/0,1902,16071,00.html
(“You don’t have to be a pirate to be concerned about this trend . . . .”).
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companies engage in practices so unfair that the labels themselves do not
deserve equitable treatment. The labels, however, have done exactly the
opposite, reinforcing their schoolyard-bully image with high-profile
lawsuits that threaten small-time music downloaders with extraordinary
fines.200
As mentioned earlier, dissonance theory teaches that
unnecessarily harsh penalties have less deterrent effect and can actually
strengthen cognitions that reinforce undesired behavior.201 Taking steps
that increase resentment of the music industry promotes the belief that the
labels do not deserve fair treatment and further reduces cognitive
dissonance with illicit downloading norms, making the practice even more
acceptable within the file-sharer community.202
[92] Apple, Inc., on the other hand, took a radically different approach
with its iTunes legal music download service, the first such offering that
could be considered a commercial success.203 Despite the fact that
Apple’s copy-protection technology was cracked soon after iTunes went
live,204 there is little evidence that the site has suffered from wholesale
piracy—at least any that might cause the devastating sales declines that

200

See Hiatt & Serpick, supra note 23.

201

See supra note 161 and accompanying text.

202

One might argue that the incommensurability of the paradigms in conflict here and
record executives’ ignorance of the characteristics of paradigm shifts both conspired to
prevent decision-makers from understanding the futility of attempting to change beliefs
and norms of behavior with a message rooted in the cognitions of the wrong paradigm.
Nonetheless, it is hard to argue that the record companies’ lawsuits against music
consumers helped in any significant way; music sales have taken a precipitous fall since
the suits began in late 2003. See Hiatt & Serpick, supra note 23 (including a Nielsen
SoundScan album sales chart that shows the rate of decline increasing sharply in 2004
and subsequent years).
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See Apple’s iTunes Grows to No. 2 U.S. Music Retailer, REUTERS.COM, Feb. 26, 2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/industryNews/idUSWNAS243320080227 (reporting that
only Wal-Mart sold more music than iTunes in 2007).
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John Borland, Program Points Way to iTunes DRM Hack, CNT NEWS, Nov. 24, 2003,
http://www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/internet/11/27/itunes.code.ap/index.html.
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have crippled the major labels.205 One difference is that young, hip music
consumers do not view Apple with the contempt they reserve for oldparadigm record companies. Apple CEO Steve Jobs has made it clear that
Apple is one of them, openly challenging the labels’ hardline anti-piracy
stance206 and furnishing iTunes with a slick interface and savvy business
model that reveals an understanding of its user community’s shared
paradigm.207 While music consumers overwhelmingly prefer illicit
download sites to the labels’ proprietary offerings, a significant minority
willingly pays Apple for content available elsewhere for free. In other
words, Apple has been more successful than the major record labels
because its business decisions, informed by an intrinsic understanding of
the online-music community’s shared paradigm, gave rise to cognitions
and cognitive dissonances critically different from those produced by the
labels’ old-paradigm tactics.
[93] This brief example hints at the power of dissonance theory to
provide an analytical framework within which one can conceptualize
interactions between communities that share different paradigms. But it is
not intended to be definitive proof of the superiority of the dissonantparadigm model. Many of the same conclusions could have been reached
through other paths and, more to the point, using paradigmatic dissonance
theory to forge a comprehensive analysis of a complex real-world
controversy would require a deeper understanding of Festinger’s and
Kuhn’s work and its linkage to modern jurisprudential thought than can be
imparted here. The point is to convey a taste of how the dissonantparadigm model might be applied and to demonstrate that such analyses
are possible, have predictive value, and can produce insights into why
seemingly logical actions have unanticipated outcomes.
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See supra note 203.
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Steve Jobs, Thoughts on Music, http://www.apple.com/hotnews/thoughtsonmusic (last
visited Oct. 15, 2009).
207

Troy Dreier, Apple iTunes Music Store, PC MAGAZINE.COM, Aug. 5, 2003,
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,1759,1194956,00.asp (receiving five-star highest rating
from online readers).
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VIII. FINAL THOUGHTS: “WE’VE ONLY JUST BEGUN”
[94] The dissonant-paradigm model may seem novel within the context
of legal analysis, but extrapolations of psychological and economic
theories to foreign disciplines are far from unique. As noted earlier, the
work of Kuhn, Christensen, and the evolutionary economists has been
successfully extended to a broad range of disciplines. And legal theorists
have certainly strayed into the social sciences—sometimes even with
results that seem deceptively similar to the work presented here.208
[95] Applying Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance to the law
may seem formidable to legal professionals who lack training in
psychology, but similar efforts have already borne fruit in business
management, economics, finance, and many other fields of endeavor.209
There is no reason why the legal profession, with its centuries-long
academic legacy and huge number of peer-reviewed journals,210 cannot
develop a useful body of theory and case law in this area.

208

One must be careful to distinguish the dissonant-paradigm model from the
superficially similar Behavioral Law and Economics school, which seeks to replace the
Law and Economics school’s assumption of perfect rationality with the assertion that “all
people systematically fall prey to biases and errors in their judgment and decisionmaking
[that] lead to predictably irrational behavior.” Although the two theories may seem to
start from the same gate—with the assumption that legal analysis must account for
behavior motivated by psychological factors—the conclusions and applications are
dissimilar. This article makes no judgments about the rationality of the choices made by
individuals faced with cognitive dissonance, and that issue is irrelevant to the thesis
presented here. At most, cognitive dissonance identifies rules with which seemingly
irrational conduct can be seen to be logical and consistent. See Gregory Mitchell, Why
Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and
Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91GEO. L.J. 67, 67 (2002).
209

See, e.g., Withrow & Geljon, supra note 34 (adapting cognitive dissonance techniques
to business-management problems); Ricciardi & Simon, supra note 90 (describing
principles of the branch of behavioral economics known as behavioral finance, which
applies cognitive psychology, including dissonance theory, to the behavior of financial
markets); see also the many other examples cited supra in note 90.
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In 2007, there were, for example, over 1100 active law journals in existence in the
United States. Karen Dybis, 100 Best Law Reviews, NAT’L JURIST, Feb. 2008, at 22.
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[96] It would be impossible to fully explore such an expansive thesis in
this limited space. This article attempts to provide no more than an aerial
view of the dissonant-paradigm model’s logical flow and overarching
concepts, and strives to do so in terms familiar to a legal audience.
Numerous opportunities exist for interested readers to flesh out this
skeletal work and delve more deeply and subtly into the topic from both
legal and extralegal perspectives.
[97] In conclusion, we reiterate our position that paradigmatic
dissonance does not take sides in paradigm-shift controversies and, despite
some of the examples cited here, should not be condemned out of hand as
a backhanded effort to justify copyright infringement. To the contrary, it
proposes a broader perspective that accommodates the viewpoints of both
parties to a controversy and acknowledges the fact that new-paradigm
business models and communities, despite the havoc they wreak on
established industries, cultures, and legal systems, serve a vital economic
function. In other words, we go no further than to hold that such pioneers
should not be reflexively dismissed as criminals merely because their
activities defy traditional standards.
[98] Paradigmatic dissonance brings to the table a new way for the law
to conceptualize the processes that drive paradigm shifts, a framework
within which lawmakers and adjudicators can better evaluate responses to
complex and subtle social problems. It is the author’s hope that this first
modest effort be cultivated by many hands into a robust model that can
better address the often-devastating business, social, and economic
problems that accompany increasingly frequent technological revolutions.
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